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How can it be used m
planning governmental audits? 
Toe answers to the first two questions are presented in a 
plausible scenario described below. After we demonstrate 
why qualitative materiality is important we will proceed 
to describe several methods for using qualitative materiality 
more effectively in governmental audit planning. 
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Government agen­cies have large amounts of sensitive data on computer 
systems ranging from national security 
to individual citizens' financia! histo­
ries. Because this information is 
sensitive, computer security becomes a 
critical issue. Suppose a newly elected, 
progressive and technologically savvy 
govemor encouraged departments to 
move towards a paperless office 
environment. Further, suppose state 
agencies responding to the governor's 
suggestions find themselves deluged 
with glitches while installing new 
computer systems. While auditing 
access to computer files in a newly 
installed computer system, an auditor 
finds evidence that an unlogged call 
carne in to the system. Although the call 
was subsequently reported on a bill, it 
was not automatically logged into the 
computer's intemal lag. In the presence 
of a host of other problems encountered 
during system implementation, the 
small dallar amount associated with 
this inconsistency would make it 
unlikely to warrant the auditor's atten­
tion. From a cost-benefit standpoint, 
tracing the source and nature of the call 
may appear unjustified. But the exis­
tence of this unlogged call is a 
qualitative materiality issue. Were there 
other errors in the computer program? 
Was other such access missed? What 
types of files were accessed by the 
caller? But then again, it was only $10. 
How should the amount of time spent 
evaluating this be determined? 
One innocuous and harmless 
outcome of the scenario is that there 
was a glitch in the program that caused 
dial-up access from within the building 
to not be logged. To be sure, this prob­
lem could be remedied easily, but it 
could be indicative of other widespread 
deficiencies in the computer system. 
Altematively, the scenario could end on 
a more sinister note with a computer 
hacker having accessed sensitive data 
about national security. If such access 
to classified information constituted a 
breach of national security, it would 
undoubtedly have serious ramifica­
tions, including incurring of a signifi­
cant liability far investigative and 
settlement costs, in addition to the 
resulting public embarrassment. The 
foregoing illustration highlights a sort 
of "iceberg effect" wherein the small 
amount that is visible reveals little 
about the real nature of the problem. 
The political sensitivity of the area 
under audit to ad verse media exposure 
and litigation concerns the nature 
rather than the size of an amount, such 
as illegal acts, bribery and corruption, 
related party transactions, snowballing 
pattems of error and other risks 
that grow with time. Qualitative mate­
riality considerations should not be 
ignored-they can and frequently do 
influence the nature and scope of 
govemmental audits. 




auditors on the 
relative importance 
of risk attributes. 
Guidance from Professional 
Literature and Standards 
Financia! Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Concepts State­ment No.2 defines materiality 
as the magnitude of an omission or 
misstatement that would influence the 
decisions of a user of the financia! state­
ments. Auditors use materiality in 
planning audits and in evaluating the 
effects of disclosures, or absence there­
of, in financia! statements. Statements 
on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 47 
(AU 312), which discusses audit risk 
and materiality in planning an audit, 
states that "As a result of the interac­
tion of quantitative and qualitative 
considerations in materiality judg­
ments, misstatements of relatively 
small amounts that come to the auditor's 
attention could have a material effect 
on the financia! statements." (Emphasis 
added) 
AU 312 also requires auditors to 
consider audit risk and to make a pre­
liminary judgment about materiality at 
the inception of a financia! statement 
audit. Toe term risk, in a general sense, 
can be thought of simply as "the prob­
ability of something going wrong." The 
idea of risk, which underlies material­
ity judgments, is a qualitative notion. 
Further, value judgments regarding the 
assumed responsibilities of manage­
ment to stakeholders (employees and 
the public) lie at the core of materiality 
determination. It is possible to view risk 
as a measure of uncertainty and mate­
riality as a measure of magnitude or 
size. Taken together they measure the 
uncertainty of amounts of a given 
magnitude. Unfortunately, quantitative 
materiality captures, at best, only a 
portian of the risk dimension and it is 
necessary to resort to qualitative 
materiality to obtain a more complete 
picture. Toe significance of qualitative 
factors in such measurement is evident. 
It is true that auditors find it neces­
sary to quantify the preliminary judg­
ment about materiality as a practical 
matter. However, such quantification 
may divert attention from qualitative 
materiality. Contemporary auditing 
practice essentially interprets material­
ity judgments as referring to dollar 
thresholds or ranges, a predominantly 
quantitative perspective. A closer look 
at the FASB definition of materiality 
suggests otherwise: the term "magni­
tude" has a more comprehensive 
meaning and implies consideration of 
both qualitative and quantitative ma­
teriality. See Figure 1 far a definition and 
examples of qualitative materiality. 
Qualitative materiality consists of 
intangibles that can be easily identified 
but, by definition, are not easily quan­
tified. However, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that experienced auditors are 
somehow able to intuitively judge the 
degree of significance of the qualitative 
attributes of risk. Hence there is 
considerable value to generating a 
reasonably stable system of risk rank­
ing-a uniform approach is far superi­
or to having no such ranking system at 
all. Risk attributes may be represented 
on a continuum, an ascending numer­
ical scale of importance, say from 1 to 
10, with 1 indicating the least risk and 
10 indicating maximum risk. A com­
mon approach to expressing subjective 
judgments on a quantified scale also 
helps achieve a reasonable amount of 
consistency in measurement. Once a 
risk ranking system is in place, auditors 
may judge risk attributes falling below 
specific landmark values or ranges on 
a subjective scale to be relatively less 
important than those lying at the high 
end of the scale. Clearly, risk attributes 
judged to be qualitatively important 
must be addressed and warrant rela­
tively more audit effort. Of course, the 
difficulty lies in achieving consensus 
among auditors on the relative impor­
tance of risk attributes. Unless we find 
sorne feasible and defensible means of 
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characterizing qualitative materiality, 
we are likely to find auditors placing 
undue emphasis on quantitative mate­
riality as a guide far their audit efforts. 
Herzlinger asserts " ... the perfor­
mance of governments is shrouded 
behind a veil of secrecy that is lifted 
only when blatant disasters occur."1 
Because incidents such as the massive 
Orange County, California, derivatives 
losses are relatively rare, the complete 
absence or delayed nature of feedback 
regarding the results of an audit allows 
the effectiveness of governmental 
audits to remain uncontested. Conse­
quently, govem ent auditors who are -r 
concerned about the severe demand& 
on their time and effort may choose to 
downplay the significance of qualita­
tive materiality. However, beca use they 
deal with public funds, govemment 
auditors have additional fiduciary 
responsibilities, which introduces spe­
cial risks that are usually qualitative in 
nature. Further, the public is increas­
ingly strident in its demands far greater 
accountability in the public sector, in 
the form of more efficient and effective 
management of public aid programs, 
better conservation of scarce resources 
and more effective reporting. Conse­
quently, the issue of qualitative 
materiality is going to become more 
prominent in the coming years. 
lncorporating Oualitative 
Materiality: Conjoint and 
Disjoint Approaches 
udit planning needs to in­
corporate considerations of 
audit effectiveness and audit 
efficiency. The efficiency of an audit 
pertains to the levels of time, cost and 
effort expended on component audit 
tasks. 0n the other hand, the effective­
ness of the audit can be measured by 
the levels of goal-attainment, opinion 
accuracy, user-satisfaction and peer 
review. Auditors must carefully plan to 
ensure that an appropriate balance 
between efficiency and effectiveness is 
achieved during an audit. Poor assess­
ment of the planning materiality far an 
audit can seriously compromise both 
audit efficiency ("over-auditing") and 
audit effectiveness ("under-auditing"). 
The remainder of this article presents 
several approaches to audit planning that 
provide more consideration of qualita­
tive materiality, without denying the ob­
vious importance of quantitative rnateri-
Figure 1 
Qualitative Materiality: Sorne lllustrations 
Qualitative materiality refers to the nature of a transaction or amount and includes many 
financia! and nonfinancial items that, independent of dollar amount, may influence the 
decisions of a user of the financia! statements. Elements of inherent control and other 
subjectively expressed and intangible risks may be captured among certain qualitative 
materiality factors. For example, qualitative materiality factors with a strong inherent risk 
componant might include política! appointments, auditee's responsiveness to prior audit 
recommendations, leval of tachnology implementad and observed error patterns and 
trends. Examples of qualitative materiality factors that could also be interpreted as 
interna! control waaknesses might include, lax background check policies far new hires, 
poor disaster recovery procedures, ineffective safeguards over voluminous cash 
handling and inadequate supervision of key employees. Additional qualitative materiality 
factors may include, red flags arousing suspicions of fraud perpetration, lack of compli­
ance with laws and regulations, changas in the long-term trends in account balances or 
ratios, quality of accounting personnel and efficacy of operational controls. 
Figure2 
Applying the Conjoint Approach: An Example 
Each summer the State Fair rents the fairgrounds far special events. State law mandates 
that each time there is an event at the fairgrounds certain essential services must be 
made available, such as paramedics and ambulan ces. Contracts far these legally man­
dated services are open for bidding periodically. The head of the State Fair Park has the 
authority to award contracts less than $10,000 without following sealed bid procedures. 
Because of the small dollar value of these contracts, the propriety of the awards has 
never been questioned in the past. The extraordinary success of the incumbent medica! 
services contractor owing to his or her long-term association (15 years) with the State 
Fair Park is a qualitative issue. For example, why are other medica! services firms not a ble 
to secure a contract with the State Fair Park? Unless the auditor makes an effort to evalu­
ate these contracts it may not come to light that the head of the State Fair Park and the 
medica! sarvices contractor are siblings. Consequently, while planning the current audit, 
it is important to ansure contracts are appropriately awarded and disclosed. Potential 
conflicts of interest could result in profaund embarrassment if, undar such relatad party 
arrangements, the State Fair Park were faund liable far the provision of inadequate or 
substandard medica! services. 
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ality. Government auditors may consid­
er quantitative and qualitative material­
ity issues together, the conjoint method, 
or separately, the disjoint method. 
The Conjoint Approach 
he conjoint approach incorpo­
ratei'l quantitative and qualita­
tive materiality into one audit 
test plan, by making a suitable adjust­
ment far their combined effect on the 
assessed materiality threshold. One 
way to do this would be to quantify the 
more intangible or qualitative aspects 
and express them on a predefined nu­
merical scale or range. This adjustment 
factor can then be used to raise or lower 
the quantitatively expressed material­
ity thresholds previously determined, 
thus influencing the nature and extent 
of testing to be performed. The appli­
cation of the conjoint approach is 
illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that 
the relatively smaller dollar value of 
these contracts may warrant the use of 
the conjoint method. 
The auditor would develop an 
adjustment factor, depending upon his 
or her judgment and the level of risk on 
the continuum, which would most 
likely lower the quantitative material­
ity threshold previously determined. 
The auditor, by lowering the overall 
planning materiality thresholds, is 
automatically increasing the scope 
and/ or extent of testing performed and 
also increasing the likelihood of 
finding a pattem of errors or irregular­
ities in awarding smaller contracts with 
a cumulatively material effect. In the 
example outlined in Figure 2, sufficient 
lowering of the materiality threshold 
may improve the chance of identifying 
medical service contracts that were 
awarded improperly. Sorne sort of a 
sliding scale may be employed to 
achieve proportionate reductions in the 
overall materiality threshold as the risk 
ranking goes higher. 
Despite the fact that the conjoint 
method may be effective for sorne situ­
ations, it neglects sorne crucial aspects 
and may not properly incorporate 
qualitative aspects in all situations. For 
example, suppose a proposed law has 
only an indirect effect on the financial 
statements. Lowering the planning ma­
teriality will surely increase the extent 
of testing performed, but may not 
adequately address the implications of 
the proposed law and the attendant 
impact on the financial statements. 
Following the conjoint method in these 
circumstances may have the undesir­
able outcome of an inefficient and 
ineffective audit. The auditor will need 
to plan tests specifically to address the 
qualitative factors to limit the risk of 
material misstatement due to one or 
more qualitative factors. As explained 
more fully below, the need for separa te 
testing makes the disjoint approach 
preferable in certain circumstances. 
The Disjoint Approach 
n the disjoint approach, both 
aspects of materiality, quantitative 
and qualitative, are considered 
separately while planning and per­
forming the audit. Under this altema­
tive, the assessed quantitative materi­
ality threshold is not adjusted for the 
Figure3 
Applying the Disjoint Approach: An Example 
Two customer complaints regarding the improper accounting of vehicle registration 
at a particular Division of Motor Vehicle (DMV) location were reported in the local 
newspaper. The small number of íncidents was determinad by the auditor to be indepen­
dent, isolated and immaterial. From a qualitative materiality standpoint, however, these 
incidents are not necessarily immaterial. The ability of these disgruntled customers to 
prove they had paid for their registration with a personal check as identified in the news 
article gives rise to serious cause for concern. The fact that the transactions were not 
recordad in the DMV's computerized registration system suggests a previously unrecog­
nized interna! control deficiency. Even a single customer complaint thus reflects a 
qualitative materiality issue. 
qualitative materiality factors identi­
fied during audit planning. Instead, the 
auditor evaluates qualitative material­
ity separately and performs additional 
tests as necessary. An application of the 
disjoint method is illustrated in Figure 3. 
If the disjoint method was used for 
the example in Figure 3, the original 
(quantitative) planning materiality 
threshold would not be adjusted for the 
qualitative concems identified by the 
auditor. Instead, the auditor should try 
to obtain assurance regarding the 
recording of registration transactions 
through additional methods and alter­
na ti ve procedures. Such methods may 
include observation of employees 
recording registration payments, 
analytical reviews to determine which 
employees consistently report short­
falls as well as when and where these 
shortfalls occur, etc. These tests would 
be in addition to the extent of testing 
determined by the tolerable rnisstate­
ment or tolerable error. 
Evaluation of 
Conceptual Framework 
he separate identification and 
evaluation of qualitative ma­
teriality issues has advantages 
and disadvantages. The main advan­
tage of the disjoint approach is that no 
adjustments to the current threshold of 
planning materiality and tolerable rnis­
statement are necessary. However, a 
formal means of evaluating qualitative 
factors must be developed. This may 
be as simple as including illustrative or 
concrete language to work papers 
that identify the qualitative aspects 
being evaluated or it may be more 
sophisticated and require identifying a 
separate audit cycle that requires spe­
cialized abilities, such as forensic or 
investiga ti ve auditing. Inherent limita-
tions of the disjoint approach include: 
• the possibility that all qualitatively
material items may not be identifi­
able (under-auditing);
• the auditor may fail to identify rele­
vant factors (under-auditing); and
• the auditor may unknowingly include 
inappropriate factors ( over-auditing).
On the other hand, specific tests
can be designed and tailored to d1ffer­
ent requirements and the qualitative 
factors identified can be more com­
pletely analyzed. 
The conjoint approach permits the 
carrying out of the same audit test with 
an appropriately reduced planning 
materiality threshold responsive to a 
SPRING 1998 
sliding scale computation. Such inte­
gration of both qualitative and quanti­
tative aspects in one planning materi­
ality threshold is theoretically 
appealing. Moreover, using this method 
may trap "smaller" errors that never­
theless exert a cumulatively material im­
pact on the financial statements taken as 
a whole. However, as noted befare, the 
significant.disadvantage seems to be in 
cases where the sliding scale computa­
tion reinforces the quantitative materi­
ality perspective, and qualitative mate­
riality aspects are largely ignored. 
Consequently, the conjoint approac� 
may be inappropriate whenever suffi:>, 
cient lowering of the materiality thresh­
old fails to occur beca use the severity of 
the qualitative risk dimension has not 
been recognized. 
As stated above, the conjoint and 
disjoint methods are preferable in dif­
ferent audit situations. However, the 
two methods may be used together in 
certain audits. Deciding which method 
to incorpora te for different situations is 
a matter of auditor judgment. 
The govemmental auditing profes­
sion could potentially reap significant 
benefits by adopting a comprehensive 
materiality framework in practice. 
Incorporating such a framework not 
only gives explicit consideration to 
qualitative and quantitative factors but 
also ensures that governmental audi­
tors are in compliance with SAS No. 47 
(AU 312) and the Yellow Book. In 
addition, the Chief Financial Officers 
Act of 1990 and other related develop­
ments seem to imply the need for 
govemment entities to be run more like 
a business. Careful consideration of 
issues surrounding materiality is 
imperative in helping govemments to 
opera te more efficiently and effectively. 
Conclusion 
G ovemment agencies are entrusted with a significant amount of public funds. 
Therefore, it is important that there 
exists a well-defined system of ac­
countability to ensure these finances 
are managed prudently. Govemment 
auditors use materiality judgments to 
determine whether the established 
systems of accountability are operating 
effectively. A key component of overall 
materiality judgments is consideration 
of qualitative materiality. 
Two altematives for incorporating 
qualitative materiality have been iden-
tified in this article. The conjoint 
approach incorporates both quantita­
tive and qualitative materiality and 
adjusts the quantitative materiality 
threshold for qualitative factors. The 
other method, the disjoint approach, 
considers qualitative and quantitative 
materiality factors separately in plan­
ning govemmental audits. 
While qualitative aspects have been 
considered in the past, it is difficult to 
establish an observable link to the 
samples chosen and the audit tests 
performed. However, this difficulty 
hardly justifies ignoring the unique 
significance of qualitative materiality 
in govemmental audit planning. 
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that 
qualitative materiality as a concept has 
only been in the periphery of the audi­
tor's vision. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that qualitative materiality may 
not have been adequately considered 
in audits of govemment agencies 
experiencing large losses from deriva­
tive transactions, federally insured 
banks that have since become insolvent 
and in well-publicized cases of fraud. 
Formally recognizing the significance 
of qualitative materiality in planning 
govemment audits will provide for 
more effective audits. lt will also 
generally blunt the public criticism 
targeted towards govemment auditors 
and the quality of their audits. 
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of testing to be performed. The appli­
cation of the conjoint approach is 
illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that 
the relatively smaller dollar value of 
these contracts may warrant the use of 
the conjoint method. 
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adjustment factor, depending upon his 
or her judgment and the level of risk on 
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likely lower the quantitative material­
ity threshold previously determined. 
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na ti ve procedures. Such methods may 
include observation of employees 
recording registration payments, 
analytical reviews to determine which 
employees consistently report short­
falls as well as when and where these 
shortfalls occur, etc. These tests would 
be in addition to the extent of testing 
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sliding scale computation. Such inte­
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to incorpora te for different situations is 
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sion could potentially reap significant 
benefits by adopting a comprehensive 
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only gives explicit consideration to 
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tors are in compliance with SAS No. 47 
(AU 312) and the Yellow Book. In 
addition, the Chief Financial Officers 
Act of 1990 and other related develop­
ments seem to imply the need for 
govemment entities to be run more like 
a business. Careful consideration of 
issues surrounding materiality is 
imperative in helping govemments to 
opera te more efficiently and effectively. 
Conclusion 
G ovemment agencies are entrusted with a significant amount of public funds. 
Therefore, it is important that there 
exists a well-defined system of ac­
countability to ensure these finances 
are managed prudently. Govemment 
auditors use materiality judgments to 
determine whether the established 
systems of accountability are operating 
effectively. A key component of overall 
materiality judgments is consideration 
of qualitative materiality. 
Two altematives for incorporating 
qualitative materiality have been iden-
tified in this article. The conjoint 
approach incorporates both quantita­
tive and qualitative materiality and 
adjusts the quantitative materiality 
threshold for qualitative factors. The 
other method, the disjoint approach, 
considers qualitative and quantitative 
materiality factors separately in plan­
ning govemmental audits. 
While qualitative aspects have been 
considered in the past, it is difficult to 
establish an observable link to the 
samples chosen and the audit tests 
performed. However, this difficulty 
hardly justifies ignoring the unique 
significance of qualitative materiality 
in govemmental audit planning. 
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that 
qualitative materiality as a concept has 
only been in the periphery of the audi­
tor's vision. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that qualitative materiality may 
not have been adequately considered 
in audits of govemment agencies 
experiencing large losses from deriva­
tive transactions, federally insured 
banks that have since become insolvent 
and in well-publicized cases of fraud. 
Formally recognizing the significance 
of qualitative materiality in planning 
govemment audits will provide for 
more effective audits. lt will also 
generally blunt the public criticism 
targeted towards govemment auditors 
and the quality of their audits. 
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